I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in
two main strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments
for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will first overview Avicenna’s
theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī ) of the soul
and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s
view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī ) of the soul and how
the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on his account.
I will then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments
presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality
of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary
physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I
will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul — dealt
with here — do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of
contemporary physicalism. Moreover, these arguments involve conflations
of epistemological or ontological issues.
Pagine: