University of Notre Dame philosopher John O’Callaghan argues that, according
to St. Thomas Aquinas, philosophical demonstrations for the existence
of God fail. In such demonstrations, pagan philosophers, for
instance, use the term «god» as a common name. Unlike a proper name,
a common name is communicable according to the ratio and in principle
communicable according to the res, which is to say, it is in principle subject
to quantification and plural forms. It makes sense to ask «How many
“gods” are there?» As such, the common name «god» to which demonstrations
conclude does not successfully refer to the singular supposit who
is «God» by Christians. In this essay, I argue that O’Callaghan has misunderstood
St. Thomas. The conclusion of the philosophical demonstrations
for the existence of God, e.g., the quinque viae, is not «god» — whether
as a common or proper name — but rather, it is
actus purus. Pure Act is
neither communicable according to the ratio nor according to the res. As
such, it is not subject to quantification nor plural forms. If a philosophical
demonstration concludes to actus purus, and St. Thomas believes that Aristotle
has provided such a demonstration, it successfully refers to the only
singular supposit it could, namely, the res called «God» by Christians.
While much of O’Callaghan’s analysis of our use of common and proper
names seems correct, his application of that analysis to the demonstration
of the existence of God does not have the purchase he claims it to have,
nor does it, it seems to me, represent the mind of St. Thomas.
In his essay «Can We Demonstrate That “God Exists”?»[1] University
of Notre Dame philosopher John O’Callaghan presents a thoughtprovoking
interpretation of philosophical proofs for the existence of
God. Much of what he affirms explicitly seems right, supplying precision
to what we often say imprecisely about such things. I would like to quibble,
however, with bits of his analysis, and in particular, its implications
for affirming or denying the possibility of philosophical knowledge of
the existence of the res who is the one true God of Jesus Christ.
O’Callaghan’s claim is that, while the propositions «a god exists» and
«there is only one god» are philosophically demonstrable, the proposition
«God exists» is not. As he states, «[T]he statement God exists is not
subject to a deductively valid argument that proceeds from true
premises that do not employ elements of divine revelation».[2] To be clear,
as he himself notes, O’Callaghan is not denying the doctrinal claims of
Dei Filius, namely, that we can come to know the existence of God from
the created order. Rather, in his essay, O’Callaghan’s primary concern
lay elsewhere. Ultimately, he argues that philosophical proofs for the
existence of God — including the quinque viae — do not demonstrate
that «God exists», in which case «God» is a proper name. Instead, O’-
Callaghan makes the more modest claim that the proofs only demonstrate
that «a god exists», in which case «god» is a common name, and
as such not successfully referential. This failure of reference has neither
proven the existence of nor latched on to the res who is «God».
[…]
[1] J.P. O’CALLAGHAN, Can We Demonstrate That “God Exists”?, English Edition,
«Nova et Vetera», 14/2 (2016), pp. 619–644.
[2] Ivi, p. 620, original emphasis.
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