Abstract
This essay will closely evaluate the approach of Maximus the Confessor and Thomas Aquinas to the question of human ensoulment, treating immediate
rational ensoulment at conception, Maximus’s position, and delayed
hominization, Thomas’s position. Aquinas argues that from the
semen human development proceeds through a series of generations and
corruptions. So when the body becomes vegetal in its development, the
form of the semen is thrown away (abiecta) and the vegetal form is induced
(inducitur), and so on. For Maximus, however, this Aristotelian approach
to human development presents a devastating problem for the
creative wisdom and the “logic” of Christ’s Incarnation. A careful examination
will show that both Maximus and Thomas assert the same thing
about the instantaneous rational ensoulment of Christ, but the implications
are quite different for these theologians. Finally, the essay explores
key implications these two great theologians bring to contemporary ecclesial
discourse over the dignity of life.
Introduction
This essay will closely evaluate two different medieval accounts of
ensoulment, the philosophically prevailing view known as delayed
hominization and an account that argued for immediate rational ensoulment
at conception. The two principal voices in the Catholic tradition
whom I will bring into conversation here are Thomas Aquinas
(1225–1274) and Maximus the Confessor (580–662), two truly speculative
giants of the theological tradition. Thomas has a thoroughly developed
notion of delayed hominization while Maximus argues that
humanity must be total from the moment of conception. The differences
between these two consequential thinkers illustrate the importance
of the notion of natura at the heart of the ensoulment question.
One of the key elements of Maximus’s thought is his notion of the
λόγοι of creation, which has a key role in the topic of this essay as will
become evident. The λόγοι preexist in the divine mind from all eternity
in a similar way to Thomas Aquinas’s notion of the divine ideas.
But this essay departs from this similarity into an exploration of an interesting
difference between Maximus and Thomas, one that arises when
considering the infusion of the soul. Maximus bases his rejection of
Aristotle’s notion of progressive ensoulment, or delayed hominization,
on his own theory of the λόγοι, arguing that a man and a woman’s
begetting a lower creature would advance a philosophically intolerable
account of human nature. From there, he also develops theological reasons
against delayed hominization, identifying a certain Chistological
unfittingness against delayed hominization. On the other hand, the
essay will show that Thomas follows Aristotle’s account of progressive
ensoulment. He stops short, however, of applying progressive ensoulment
to the human soul of Jesus Christ. And here he and Maximus are
in accord. Aquinas avoids this pitfall by proposing that in Christ the
formation of the body, the infusion of a rational soul, and the union
with the Word occurred simultaneously in the Incarnation. Nevertheless,
the reason for the difference must be reckoned with: Ought
Aquinas to have rejected Aristotle’s notion of progressive ensoulment
for the philosophical reasons Maximus gives? My argument in the affirmative
is the ultimate burden of this essay. Finally, the essay explores
key implications these two great theologians bring to contemporary
ecclesial discourse over the dignity of life.
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