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Articolo contenuto in Vol. 99 Anno 2022 --> Fasc. 3

Maximus the Confessor and Thomas Aquinas on Delayed Hominization: Similarity and Difference

Abstract

This essay will closely evaluate the approach of Maximus the Confessor and Thomas Aquinas to the question of human ensoulment, treating immediate rational ensoulment at conception, Maximus’s position, and delayed hominization, Thomas’s position. Aquinas argues that from the semen human development proceeds through a series of generations and corruptions. So when the body becomes vegetal in its development, the form of the semen is thrown away (abiecta) and the vegetal form is induced (inducitur), and so on. For Maximus, however, this Aristotelian approach to human development presents a devastating problem for the creative wisdom and the “logic” of Christ’s Incarnation. A careful examination will show that both Maximus and Thomas assert the same thing about the instantaneous rational ensoulment of Christ, but the implications are quite different for these theologians. Finally, the essay explores key implications these two great theologians bring to contemporary ecclesial discourse over the dignity of life.


Introduction

This essay will closely evaluate two different medieval accounts of ensoulment, the philosophically prevailing view known as delayed hominization and an account that argued for immediate rational ensoulment at conception. The two principal voices in the Catholic tradition whom I will bring into conversation here are Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Maximus the Confessor (580–662), two truly speculative giants of the theological tradition. Thomas has a thoroughly developed notion of delayed hominization while Maximus argues that humanity must be total from the moment of conception. The differences between these two consequential thinkers illustrate the importance of the notion of natura at the heart of the ensoulment question. One of the key elements of Maximus’s thought is his notion of the λόγοι of creation, which has a key role in the topic of this essay as will become evident. The λόγοι preexist in the divine mind from all eternity in a similar way to Thomas Aquinas’s notion of the divine ideas.

But this essay departs from this similarity into an exploration of an interesting difference between Maximus and Thomas, one that arises when considering the infusion of the soul. Maximus bases his rejection of Aristotle’s notion of progressive ensoulment, or delayed hominization, on his own theory of the λόγοι, arguing that a man and a woman’s begetting a lower creature would advance a philosophically intolerable account of human nature. From there, he also develops theological reasons against delayed hominization, identifying a certain Chistological unfittingness against delayed hominization. On the other hand, the essay will show that Thomas follows Aristotle’s account of progressive ensoulment. He stops short, however, of applying progressive ensoulment to the human soul of Jesus Christ. And here he and Maximus are in accord. Aquinas avoids this pitfall by proposing that in Christ the formation of the body, the infusion of a rational soul, and the union with the Word occurred simultaneously in the Incarnation. Nevertheless, the reason for the difference must be reckoned with: Ought Aquinas to have rejected Aristotle’s notion of progressive ensoulment for the philosophical reasons Maximus gives? My argument in the affirmative is the ultimate burden of this essay. Finally, the essay explores key implications these two great theologians bring to contemporary ecclesial discourse over the dignity of life.



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Pubblicazione Autunno 2022

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